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6.1 Setting the Scene: The Relevance of the Issue
Arbitrary deprivation of nationality is of serious concern to the international community.
Such acts of the State effectively place the persons concerned in a ‘legal vacuum’ regarding
the enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms,1 in particular in areas of
education, housing, employment, health and social security since these persons are put in
a situation of high vulnerability to human rights violations. In case of denationalization,
the persons affected become non-citizens with respect to the State that deprived them of
their nationality (either still possessing another nationality, and consequently becoming
aliens in their motherland, or in the worst case the individual is rendered stateless). Persons
arbitrarily deprived of nationality may thus be exposed to poverty, social exclusion, and
limited legal capacity.2 Nevertheless, this aspect of nationality law is somewhat neglected
by legal and socio-political literature. The history and current practice as well as the mag-
nitude of the problem would nonetheless require closer attention and concerted action of
the international community, but principally tangible efforts from the individual States.
Even after the creation of the United Nations, in the last couple of decades, racial and
ethnic minorities have been arbitrarily stripped of their nationality and rendered stateless
in a considerable number of countries around the world.3
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1 This is impressively illustrated by the Report of the UN Secretary-General of 19 December 2011, which
analyses the impact of arbitrary deprivation of nationality on the enjoyment of human rights, including civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights (A/HRC/19/43).
2 UN Human Rights Council, resolution 20/5 of 16 July 2012, operative Para. 7.
3 Examples for such en masse denationalization include the following: 1) In Bhutan, extremely burdensome
requirements of successive nationality acts in 1977 and 1985 resulted in the arbitrary deprivation of
nationality of over 100,000 southern Bhutanese of Nepali origin and their forced removal from Bhutan to
Nepal in the early 1990s. 2) Tens of thousands of black Mauritanians were stripped of citizenship documents,
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The present paper first highlights the role of international law in regulating nationality
(Part 6.2) and the international legal framework prohibiting the deprivation of nationality,
starting with human rights conventions in which this prohibition appears as the negative
aspect of everyone’s right to nationality; examining thereafter specific statelessness conven-
tions such as the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness or the 1997
European Convention on Nationality (Part 6.3). Subsequently, it continues to delineate
different situations amounting to arbitrariness when deciding on the withdrawal of a
nationality (Part 6.4), including the discussion of possible ex post effective remedies (Part
6.5). As a relatively new phenomenon, even European Union (EU) law has not been left
untouched by this issue. Despite the lack of explicit EU competences in this regard, the
obligation not to arbitrarily deprive someone’s nationality has been completed with EU
law requirements, principally stemming from the fundamental character of EU citizenship
(Part 6.6). Remarkably, convergences between UN (soft) law and EU (case) law can be
observed in the light of the recent developments (Part 6.7).
6.2 State Sovereignty and Regulating Nationality: The Basics
Even if ‘nationality’ is an issue of interest for public international law, its definition and
content are still primarily determined by the States.4 Under international law, the traditional
point of departure is that nationality matters (e.g. acquisition, loss, renunciation and
deprivation of nationality) fall within the domestic jurisdiction (domaine resérvé) of States.
This doctrine was already reaffirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) in its advisory opinion on Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (1923)
as follows: ‘in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the
opinion of the Court, in principle within this reserved domain’.5 However, the PCIJ did
not stop there and left a door open, having also referred to possible developments of
then forcibly expelled from their country in 1989, who have been living in a situation of de facto statelessness
in Senegal ever since. 3) In Zimbabwe, a nationality law adopted in 2002 obliged anyone presumed to have
any other nationality to renounce the claim to that second nationality or else lose Zimbabwean citizenship.
This new law was applied specifically against particular ethnic groups with surnames considered ‘non-
Zimbabwean.’ Source: Open Society Institute, Citizenship and Equality in Practice: Guaranteeing Non-Dis-
criminatory Access to Nationality, Protecting the Right to be Free from Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality
and Combating Statelessness, November 2005, pp. 10-11.
4 See for instance P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Stevens & Sons, London, 1956,
pp. 29-32; H.F. van Panhuys, The Rôle of Nationality in International Law, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1959, pp.
37-38; M.N. Shaw, International Law, 5th edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 574,
585; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 373-374;
O. Dörr, ‘Nationality’, in W. Rüdiger (Ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford
University Press, 2012.
5 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on 8th November, 1921, PCIJ, Ser. B. No. 4,
1923, Para. 40.
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international law in the course of time when it added that ‘[t]he question whether a certain
matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question;
it depends upon the development of international relations.’6 Furthermore, not only may
the future developments in international law have an impact on this issue, but already at
the time of the dispute the Court did not consider this State prerogative to be absolute
when it stated: ‘in a matter which, like that of nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by
international law, the right of a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by
obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States’7 and identified limits fixed
by international law, embracing both customary law and general as well as particular treaty
law.8 A couple of years later the president of the Mexican-French Claims Commission
reconfirmed this approach in the Georges Pinson case (1928) holding that notwithstanding
States’ exclusive domestic jurisdiction in matters of nationality, this sovereignty can be
limited by customary and treaty law rules of international law.9 This position is now settled
case-law as evidenced by the case-law of other human rights courts (e.g. the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights).10
It was the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws11 that first codified the above approach, which – besides reconfirming
nationality issues as belonging to the realm of States’ domestic jurisdiction – set forth
certain limitations stemming from international law on invoking a certain nationality vis-
à-vis other States, i.e. on the eventual effects of nationality on the international plane. By
virtue of Articles 1 and 2 of the 1930 Hague Convention,
[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This
law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with interna-
6 Ibid., Para. 41 (emphasis added).
7 Ibid., Para. 41 (emphasis added).
8 Ibid., Para. 38.
9 Georges Pinson (France) v. United Mexican States, 19 October 1928, UN Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, Volume V, p. 364. In the French original: ‘[…] tout Etat est en principe, compétent pour fixer
souverainement les conditions dont dépendront l’acquisition et la perte de sa nationalité et que tout tribunal
international doit naturellement (sauf le cas de restrictions posées à la souveraineté des Etats litigants par le
droit international écrit ou coutumier) acquiescer aux réglementations qu’ont fixées les Etats en question.’
10 See e.g. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984, Series A No. 4, Para.
32: ‘[…] despite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral and regulation of nationality are
matters for each state to decide, contemporary developments indicate that international law does impose
certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by the states in that area, and that the manners in which states
regulate matters bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within their sole jurisdiction; those powers
of the state are also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights.’Reiterated
in case of the Yean and Bosico Children v. The Dominican Republic, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
Judgment of September 8, 2005, Series C No. 130, Para. 138.
11 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 13 April 1930, League of
Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 179, No. 4137, p. 89.
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tional conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally
recognised with regard to nationality.
[…]
Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular
State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State.
In other words, how a State exercises its right to determine its nationals should conform
to the relevant rules of international law, at least if such a nationality is meant to be accepted
and considered as valid by other States. Violating those restrictions stemming from inter-
national law, which are aptly called ‘negative international nationality law’ by Paul Weis,12
will not invalidate the given nationality, but excludes its opposability against other States
and prevents invoking it before international judicial fora as well as authorities of other
States are entitled not to recognize it.13 We can conclude that the 1930 Hague Convention
codified customary international law in this regard,14 and subsequent universal15 or
regional16 conventions also follow this fundamental principle. Despite the fact that acqui-
sition and loss of nationality are essentially governed by domestic legislation, today their
regulation is of direct concern to the international legal order.17 ‘The competence of States
in this field may be exercised only within the limits set by international law’ – opined the
International Law Commission (ILC).18
Throughout the 20th century, the limitations deriving from international treaties,
customary law and principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality have
been enriched mainly due to the gradual expansion of the international protection of
human rights. This ‘humanrightization’ of international law triggered a paradigm shift
also in this domain. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights put it expressively,
‘the classic doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute granted by the State
12 Weis, 1956, p. 92.
13 See also e.g. Dörr, 2012, Para. 4.
14 Weis, 1956, p. 65; C. Joseph, Nationality and Diplomatic Protection. The Commonwealth of Nations, A.W.
Sijthoff, Leyden, 1969, p. 8; S. Hall, ‘The European Convention on Nationality and the Right to Have Rights’,
European Law Review, December 1999, p. 589; M. Ganczer, Állampolgárság és államutódlás, Dialóg Campus,
Budapest, 2013, p. 65.
15 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women of 20 February 1957 (UNTS No. 4468, Vol. 309, p. 65),
entered into force on 11 August 1958.
16 1997 European Convention on Nationality (CETS No. 166). Its Art. 3 is almost identical with the definition
contained in Art. 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention (‘1. Each State shall determine under its own law who
are its nationals. 2. This law shall be accepted by other States in so far as it is consistent with applicable
international conventions, customary international law and the principles of law generally recognised with
regard to nationality’).
17 Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/13/34,
14 December 2009, Para. 19.
18 Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States with commentaries
(Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 24).
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to its subjects, has gradually evolved to a conception of nationality which, in addition to
being the competence of the State, is a human right.’19 In the same vein, the International
Law Commission in its commentaries to the Draft Articles on the Nationality of Natural
Persons in relation to Succession of States highlighted that the evolution of international
human rights law has significantly altered the classical doctrine on the preponderance of
States’ interests over the interests of individuals.20
The prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality counts as one of the above
restrictions imposed by international human rights law. The right to a nationality as a core
human right,21 as some denote: ‘the right to have rights’,22 implies the right of each individ-
ual to acquire, change and retain a nationality. The right to retain a nationality is intrinsi-
cally linked to the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality (the latter might be
conceived as a precondition of the former, affording also protection to it).23 The explicit
and implicit general prohibition of arbitrarily depriving someone’s nationality, considered
now as a rule of general customary international law,24 is found in numerous international
instruments. The next part of the paper gives a tour d’horizon of such sources of law.
19 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, Para. 33.
20 Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States with commentaries
(Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 24).
21 See first, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 15 – right to a nationality); then a series of
subsequent universal treaties: 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Art. 5 – non-discrimination; right to a nationality); the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Art. 24 – right to acquire nationality); the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (Art. 9 – non-discrimination, re-acquisition, change, retention of nationality,
nationality of children); the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Arts. 7 and 8 – birth registration,
right to acquire nationality, avoidance of statelessness); the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (Art. 18 – right to acquire and change a nationality) or other regional human rights treaties such
as the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights; the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child; the 1995 Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms; or the 2004 Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights.
22 ‘Citizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights’ (United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, in Trop v. Dulles, Secretary of State et al., 356 US 86, 1958; quoted e.g. in
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, Winning the Human Race?, 1988, p. 107;
M. Achiron, Nationality and Statelessness, A Handbook for Parliamentarians, Inter-Parliamentary Union –
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 2005, back cover; or L. van Waas, Nationality
Matters: Statelessness under International Law, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2008, p. 217.
23 Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, Report of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/13/34,
14 December 2009, Paras. 21, 26.
24 See e.g. Open Society Justice Initiative, 2005, pp. 2-3; M. Manly and L. van Waas, ‘The Value of the Human
Security Framework in Addressing Statelessness’, in A. Edwards and C. Ferstman (Eds.), Human Security
and Non-Citizens, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 63; Dörr, 2012, Para. 32; UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Expert Meeting – Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding
Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality (‘Tunis Conclusions’), March 2014, Para.
2. In the Hungarian legal scholarship, e.g. A. Lőrincz, ‘Az állampolgársághoz való jog a nemzetközi jogban.
A nemzeti szuverenitástól a mindenkit megillető emberi jogig’, 13 Romániai Magyar Jogtudományi Közlöny
(2008), pp. 41-48. Nonetheless, some other authors are not convinced about its customary international law
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6.3 The Evolution of the International Law Framework
Starting with the universal level, the very first source of this cornerstone principle corollary
to the right to a nationality is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).25
Its Article 15(2) contains the famous expression of the general rule: ‘No one shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality’. Further
United Nations (UN) human rights conventions incorporated this fundamental norm as
well, either implicitly [e.g. 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women,26 1965
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),27 1979
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),28
or 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)29]; or, more recently, explicitly [2006
Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)30]. This general legal framework
on the international protection of human rights is complemented by a specific instrument,
character, arguing that “the only limit imposed by customary international law on States’ powers to withdraw
nationality is the one banning measures of denaturalization based solely on racial or religious reasons since
such acts would infringe the customary law rule on non-discrimination on grounds of race and religion.”
(R. Hofmann, ‘Denaturalization and Forced Exile’, in W. Rüdiger (Ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law, Oxford, University Press, 2013, Para. 17).
25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 217 A(III) of
10 December 1948. The UDHR is available in 369 language variations on the website of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
26 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women of 20 February 1957 (UNTS No. 4468, Vol. 309, p. 65),
entered into force on 11 August 1958. Arts. 1-2: ‘Each Contracting State agrees that neither the celebration
nor the dissolution of a marriage between one of its nationals and an alien, nor the change of nationality by
the husband during marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the wife. […] Each Contracting
State agrees that neither the voluntary acquisition of the nationality of another State nor the renunciation
of its nationality by one of its nationals shall prevent the retention of its nationality by the wife of such
national.’
27 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965
(UNTS No. 9464, Vol. 660, p. 195), entered into force on 4 January 1969. Art. 5 lit. (d) (iii): ‘[…] States
Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the
law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: […] (d) Other civil rights, in particular: […] The right
to nationality.’
28 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979 (UNTS
No. 20378, Vol. 1249, p. 13), entered into force on 3 September 1981. Art. 9(1): ‘[…] neither marriage to an
alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality
of the wife, render her stateless […].’
29 Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 (UNTS No. 27531, Vol. 1577, p. 3), entered
into force on 2 September 1990. Art. 8(1): ‘States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve
his or her identity, including nationality […] without unlawful interference.’
30 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 13 December 2006 (UNTS No. 44910, Vol. 2515,
p. 3), entered into force on 3 May 2008. Art. 18(1) lit. (a) expressly stipulates: ‘1. States Parties shall recognize
the rights of persons with disabilities to liberty of movement, to freedom to choose their residence and to a
nationality, on an equal basis with others, including by ensuring that persons with disabilities: […] (a) Have
the right to acquire and change a nationality and are not deprived of their nationality arbitrarily or on the
basis of disability.’
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the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CRS),31 which deals specifically
with the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality in the context of statelessness.
In particular, Article 8(1) of the 1961 Convention enshrines this ban by stating that ‘Con-
tracting States shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would render
him stateless’.
If we turn our attention to de lege ferenda proposals of universal character, the same
obligation is reconfirmed in different contexts. First, the ILC’s Draft Articles on the
nationality of natural persons in relation to state succession (1999) lays down the prohibition
of arbitrary decisions concerning nationality, including not to be arbitrarily deprived of
the nationality of the predecessor State when state succession occurs (Article 16).32
Thereafter, the ILC aimed at regulating another aspect of this harsh human rights violation,
outlawing the deprivation of nationality for the sole purpose of expulsion in the Draft
Articles on the expulsion of aliens, adopted in second reading in August 2014 (Article 8).33
Its Commentaries make it clear why: such a deprivation of nationality, insofar as it has no
other justification than the State’s desire to expel the individual, would be abusive, indeed
arbitrary within the meaning of Article 15(2) UDHR.34 An interesting question arises here,
namely whether the above principles of law enshrined in the Draft Articles have already
or will in the near future attain the status of customary international law, elaborating further
the content of the generally accepted prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality.
In addition, a massive body of soft law has been developed echoing the above hard law
obligations, such as UN General Assembly resolutions adopted since the mid-‘90s,35 bur-
geoning resolutions of the former UN Commission on Human Rights36 and the Human
Rights Council,37 general comments and recommendations of different treaty bodies,38 as
31 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of August 30, 1961 (UNTS No. 14458, Vol. 989, p. 175), entered
into force on 13 December 1975.
32 Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States with commentaries
(1999), p. 37.
33 Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2014),
General Assembly Official Records, Sixty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10, A/69/10, Chapter IV, p. 33.
34 Ibid.
35 UNGA Resolution 50/152 of 21 December 1995. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(A/RES/50/152), Para. 16; UNGA Resolution 54/146 of 17 December 1999. Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (A/RES/54/146), Para 22.
36 E.g. Resolution on Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, 1997/36, 11 April 1997; Resolution
on Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, 2005/45, 19 April 2005.
37 E.g. UN Human Rights Council Resolutions 7/10 of 27 March 2008 (A/HRC/RES/7/10); 10/13 of 26 March
2009 (A/HRC/RES/10/13); 13/2 of 24 March 2010 (A/HRC/RES/13/2); 20/5 of 16 July 2012
(A/HRC/RES/20/5).
38 See for instance UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of
Movement), 2 November 1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination, CERD General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non Citizens, 1 October 2002;
or UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW General Recommendation
No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, 1994, CEDAW/C/1995/7, Annex, Appendix, chapter III
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well as a series of conclusions adopted by the Executive Committee of the High Commis-
sioner’s Programme, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR ExCom).39
Examining the regional level of the international law framework, the regional structures
in almost every continent devote specific attention to this matter of fundamental impor-
tance. Starting with Europe, the most important instrument is the 1997 European Conven-
tion on Nationality (ECN), which repeats the general prohibition set forth in the UDHR:
‘no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality.’40 This is accompanied by
soft law documents emanating either from the Committee of Ministers or the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, among which the best known is Recommendation
No. R (1999) 18 of the Committee of Ministers on the avoidance and the reduction of
statelessness (1999) laying down further requirements in order to limit deprivation of
nationality and mitigate its negative effects.41 Numerous other regional human rights
conventions incorporated a very similar provision (the 1969 American Convention on
Human Rights,42 the 1995 Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,43 and the 2004 Revised Arab Charter on Human
Rights44). Interestingly, in the 2004 Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights it is not
‘arbitrary’ deprivation which is forbidden but if someone’s nationality is deprived ‘without
a legally valid reason.’
Summing up the above, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality is now
a well-established customary norm of international law, declared by a complex set of
international instruments, on different levels of regulation. Given that this general prohi-
bition represents the negative aspect of the right to a nationality, it is submitted that under
international law as it stands today, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality
qualifies as a fundamental human right as well, protecting the individual from the unjusti-
fied and drastic interference into his/her identity by the State of nationality.
B. These general comments and recommendations may be conceived as the authentic interpretation of the
respective conventions.
39 UNHCR ExCom conclusions No. 65 (XLII) 1991; No. 78 (XLVI) 1995; No. 102 (LVI) 2005; and No. 106
(LVI) 2006 (available at: www.unhcr.org/41b4607c4.pdf, last accessed on 1 July 2014).
40 Art. 4 lit. c.
41 Point I c., point II. C. c.
42 Art. 20(3): ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it.’
43 Art. 24(2): ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his citizenship or of the right to change it.’
44 Art. 29(1): ‘Every person has the right to a nationality, and no citizen shall be deprived of his nationality
without a legally valid reason.’
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6.4 Meaning and Content of the ‘Prohibition of Arbitrary
Deprivation of Nationality’
Before going into the in-depth analysis of the meaning of the ‘prohibition of arbitrary
deprivation of nationality’ as well as exploring its content, it is first necessary to define the
notion of ‘deprivation of nationality’. ‘Deprivation’ as such always means an act without
the request/consent of the person concerned. While deprivation of nationality does not
comprise loss of nationality voluntarily requested by the individual concerned (renuncia-
tion), it comprises all other forms of involuntary loss of nationality (in other words:
denaturalization45 or denationalization).46 Resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council
clearly established that the term ‘deprivation’ in the UDHR includes both arbitrary ex lege
loss (when denaturalization occurs automatically by operation of law) and individual acts
of deprivation taken by administrative or judicial authorities.47 A different approach is
taken by the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The Convention
makes an explicit distinction when using both terms: ‘loss of nationality’ describes with-
drawal of nationality which is automatic, ex lege (Articles 5-7), and the term ‘deprivation’
denotes situations where the withdrawal of nationality is initiated by the authorities of the
State (Article 8). According to UNHCR, the category of ‘withdrawal of nationality’ in the
broad sense refers to both loss and deprivation of nationality.48 Against this backdrop, I
understand ‘deprivation’ in the broader meaning of the word, therefore, in this paper
‘deprivation of nationality’ is interchangeable with ‘withdrawal of nationality’ or ‘involun-
tary loss of nationality’. It covers all forms of denaturalization made by the State, such as
automatically depriving a person or a group of people (en masse) of a nationality by
operation of law (e.g. Slovakia’s nationality law sanctioning acquisition of another
nationality by deprivation of Slovak nationality); arbitrarily precluding a person from
retaining a nationality, particularly on discriminatory grounds; individual acts taken by
administrative or judicial authorities withdrawing someone’s nationality49; or even situations
where there is no formal act of State but the practice of the competent authorities shows
with no doubt that they have ceased to consider a particular individual or group of people
45 For the use of this term, see e.g. Hofmann, 2013, Para. 1.
46 Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009, Para.
49; Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/13/34,
14 December 2009, Para. 23; in the legal literature van Waas, 2008, p. 34; and implicitly Dörr, 2012, Para.
35.
47 R. de Groot, ‘Survey on Rules on Loss of Nationality in International Treaties and Case Law’, CEPS Paper
in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 57/August 2013, p. 1; UNHCR, ‘Tunis Conclusions’, Para. 9.
48 Ibid., Para. 9.
49 Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/13/34,
14 December 2009, Para. 23.
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as national(s) (e.g. failure to issue or renew identity documents without any explanation,
confiscation or destruction of identity documents).50
At the very outset, it shall be stressed that there is no absolute ban under international
law regarding deprivation of nationality. Denaturalization is permitted under certain
conditions, thus, States still possess a certain freedom to act in withdrawing one’s nation-
ality. However, if an act of deprivation is arbitrary, it per se violates international law. What
exactly amounts to ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of nationality is unclear, since neither the UDHR,
nor the relevant universal or regional treaties on human rights elaborate on this issue.
Other sources of law and legal scholarship should thus be considered thoroughly so as to
find legally tenable answers. Below, I shall analyse and outline the main forms and scenarios
of arbitrary deprivation of nationality which are by definition forbidden.
6.4.1 Deprivation of Nationality against the Law: Arbitrary
First of all, in light of the requirements stemming from the rule of law, deprivation of
nationality must have a firm legal basis in national law, as a precondition to making this
harsh intervention into a person’s life predictable. In other words, in order to avoid an
allegation of arbitrariness, nationality may, first and foremost, only be deprived as prescribed
by law.51 It is widely recognized that legal provisions relating to the withdrawal of nation-
ality may neither be based on analogia iuris or legis, nor be enacted or applied with
retroactivity.52 Furthermore, when interpreting the ordinary meaning53 of ‘arbitrariness’,
this term is not to be equated merely with ‘against the law’, but rather a broader meaning
should be afforded to it, encompassing also an abuse of power that is indeed achieved
through the law. By virtue of the general comments of the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
expression ‘arbitrary interference’ could also extend to interference provided for by
domestic law.54 In the HRC’s view, the introduction of the concept of arbitrariness was
intended to guarantee that even formally lawful interference, in conformity with domestic
law, shall be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the ICCPR, and
50 UNHCR, ‘Tunis Conclusions’, Para 11.
51 van Waas, 2008, p. 94.
52 Ibid., Para. 16.
53 See Art. 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (UNTS No. 18232, Vol. 1155, p.
331), entered into force on 27 January 1980.
54 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 16: Art. 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to
Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, 8 April
1988, Para. 4; UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of
Movement), 2 November 1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add., Para. 21.
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should always be reasonable given the particular circumstances.55 As a consequence, the
concept of ‘arbitrariness’ includes, beyond the ‘unlawful’, also the elements of inappropri-
ateness, injustice, illegitimacy or lack of predictability.56 This broad concept is necessary,
otherwise an interpretation of arbitrary deprivation as amounting only to illegal deprivation
would make it far too easy for States to circumvent the aim of this prohibition (i.e. to
effectively protect individuals).57 The HRC further indicated that the notion of arbitrariness
applies to the action of all State organs (legislative, administrative/executive or judicial).58
6.4.2 Deprivation of Nationality in Violation of Procedural Standards:
Arbitrary
In the preceding point I examined the most basic formality to be met for a decision not to
be deemed arbitrary, i.e. that such a decision of deprivation must conform to the law in
force. As Laura van Waas puts it: ‘This is an important criterion because it helps to ensure
that the decisions of the authority are foreseeable.’59 Besides this requirement of being in
conformity with domestic law, there are other procedural standards, developed mainly by
international human rights law, which must be met. Procedural safeguards are essential
to prevent abuses in the process of the application of law. States are thus expected to observe
minimum procedural standards in order to ensure that decisions withdrawing a nationality
do not contain any element of arbitrariness.60 First, measures leading to deprivation of
nationality must serve a legitimate purpose that is consistent with international law, in
particular with the objectives of international human rights law. Such measures must be
the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result, applied
as a measure of last resort (ultima ratio) and they must be proportional to the interest to
be protected.61 Moreover, other specific procedural guarantees also apply: any decision on
55 This interpretation is supported by the travaux préparatoires of the provision on the prohibition of arbitrary
deprivation of nationality in the UDHR [Art. 15(2)]. See N. Robinson, The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Its Origin, Significance, Application and Interpretation, Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York., 1958;
or A. Verdoodt, Naissance et Signification de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme, E. Warny,
Louvain, 1964 (both sources quoted by van Waas, 2008, p. 94).
56 Similarly see: UN Human Rights Committee, A. v. Australia, Communication No. 560/1993: Australia, 9.2;
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (April 30, 1997).
57 S. Mantu, Deprivation of Citizenship from the Perspective of International and European Legal Standards,
ENACT Consortium, FP7-SSH-2007-1-217504-ENACT/D4.2, p. 10.
58 See also: Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General.
A/HRC/13/34, 14 December 2009, Paras. 49-50.
59 van Waas, 2008, p. 113.
60 Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/13/34,
14 December 2009, Para. 43.
61 Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009, Para.
49; Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/13/34,
14 December 2009, Para. 25.
77
6 The Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality under
International Law and EU Law: New Perspectives
deprivation of nationality shall be issued with reasons stated in writing and shall be subject
to legal review by a court or an independent body (as prescribed by the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness62 and on the regional level, by the 1997 European Con-
vention on Nationality63). The right to legal (judicial) remedies provides an opportunity
for overturning unlawful, unreasonable or discriminatory decisions on denaturalization
and stands as a cornerstone of due process of law.64 These procedural safeguards have been
later reaffirmed by the International Law Commission as well, in the context of state suc-
cession. The commentaries to the Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in
relation to the Succession of States elaborated more on this: ‘[t]he requirement of giving
reasons for any negative decisions concerning nationality should be considered as one of
the prerequisites of an effective administrative or judicial review’ and concluded that the
above procedural elements represent minimum requirements in this respect. The ILC also
clarified that the adjective ‘effective’ requires that an opportunity has to be provided to
permit meaningful review of the relevant substantive issues (in the same sense as expressed
by the ICCPR).65 As a consequence, decisions depriving someone’s nationality, which are
formally in accordance with law, but falling short of these procedural standards and safe-
guards, are to be considered arbitrary under general international law.
62 Art. 8(4) stipulates: ‘A Contracting State shall not exercise a power of deprivation permitted by […] this
Article except in accordance with law, which shall provide for the person concerned the right to a fair hearing
by a court or other independent body.’
63 Art. 11 sets forth that ‘Each State Party shall ensure that decisions relating to the […] loss […] of its
nationality contain reasons in writing.’ Then Art. 12 continues as follows: ‘Each State Party shall ensure that
decisions relating to the […] loss […] of its nationality be open to an administrative or judicial review in
conformity with its internal law.’ However, this obligation is weakened by possible reservations made to
these Articles, allowed by the Convention [see Art. 29(1)] and some Council of Europe Member States
actually made use of this option (e.g. Bulgaria, Denmark or Hungary in relation to Art. 12 – see: http://con-
ventions.coe.int, last accessed on 1 July 2014). For a detailed analysis on the reservations and declarations
with respect to the Convention, see: L. Pilgram, European Convention on Nationality (ECN) 1997 and
European Nationality Laws, EUDO CITIZENSHIP Policy Brief No. 4.
64 Despite the availability of legal avenues to challenge decisions on deprivation of nationality, judicial review
might reach flowed results, in contravention of international law, as shown by recent cases in the United
Kingdom (see e.g. B2 v., The Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judgment of 24 May 2013 [2013]
EWCA Civ 616). To the contrary, the Supreme Court delivered victory against arbitrary deprivation of
nationality resulting in statelessness in the Al-Jedda case in October 2013 (Secretary of State for the Home
Department (Appellant) v. Al-Jedda (Respondent), Judgment of 9 October 2013 [2013] UKSC 62, available
at: www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/domestic-al-jedda-judgment-20131009.pdf (accessed
on 1 July 2014). For a recent analysis of UK administrative and judicial practice on deprivation of nationality,
see: S. Mantu, ‘Citizenship Deprivation in the United Kingdom. Statelessness and Terrorism’, 19 Tilburg
Law Review 2014, pp. 163-170.
65 Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States with commentaries
(Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 38).
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6.4.3 Deprivation of Nationality on Discriminatory Grounds: Arbitrary
The prohibition of arbitrary denaturalization, aiming at protecting the right to retain a
nationality, is implicitly enshrined in human rights conventions that spell out specific
forms of discrimination. As a result, deprivation of nationality may not be based on dis-
crimination on any grounds prohibited under international human rights law, either in
law or in practice.66 Going through these treaty law sources chronologically, already the
1961 Convention on the Reduction on Statelessness outlawed discrimination in the context
of deprivation of nationality specifically on racial, ethnic, religious, or political grounds
(Article 9).67 This is the only provision in the Convention not directly focused on the pre-
vention of statelessness: it is irrelevant whether such deprivation leads to statelessness or
not, it is an outright prohibition and such an act of the State is unlawful under the Conven-
tion. Article 5 lit.(d)(iii) of the 1965 CERD prohibited racial discrimination in respect of
the right to nationality, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
shed more light on this obligation highlighting that States should ‘recognize that deprivation
of citizenship on the basis of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin is a breach
of States parties’ obligations to ensure non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right to
nationality’,68 which obligation qualifies as a peremptory norm of international law (ius
cogens). While the 1979 CEDAW does not incorporate a specific prohibition in this regard
(although it recognizes women’s right to retain their nationality regardless of the celebration
or dissolution of a marriage or the change of nationality by a husband),69 later on, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women also made it explicit
that ‘nationality […] should not be arbitrarily removed because of marriage of dissolution
of marriage or because her husband or father changes his nationality.’70 Finally, the 2006
CRPD is the only core UN human rights convention which explicitly addresses the prohi-
bition of denationalization on the grounds of disability.71 In addition to these ‘hard law’
stipulations, resolutions on nationality of the UN Human Rights Council have also set out
a broad range of prohibited discriminatory grounds (such as race, colour, sex, language,
66 UNHCR, ‘Tunis Conclusions’, Para. 18.
67 Art. 9 states: ‘A Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on
racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds.’ This provision was historically designed to give effect to Art.
15(2) of the UDHR.
68 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD General Recommendation XXX on Dis-
crimination Against Non Citizens, 1 October 2002, Para. 14.
69 Art. 9.
70 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW General Recommendation
No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, 1994, Para. 6. (CEDAW/C/1995/7, Annex, Appendix,
chapter III B).
71 Art. 18(1) lit. (a): ‘States Parties shall recognize the rights of persons with disabilities […] to a nationality,
on an equal basis with others, including by ensuring that persons with disabilities: […] (a) […] are not
deprived of their nationality arbitrarily or on the basis of disability.’
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religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,
etc.).72 It can therefore be argued that the prohibited grounds for discrimination in cases
of the withdrawal of nationality include all the grounds enshrined in Article 2 of the ICCPR.
According to leading legal scholars, the non-discrimination principle regarding nationality
constitutes a rule of customary international law,73 therefore, it provides a far reaching
and effective legal safety net against arbitrary deprivation.
6.4.4 Deprivation of Nationality Resulting in Statelessness: Arbitrary
The avoidance of statelessness is a general principle of today’s international law. Stateless-
ness is undesirable not only from the viewpoint of the individual, but also from the states
(e.g. in light of issues of human security).74 Deprivation of nationality leads to statelessness
where the person concerned does not possess or immediately acquire another nationality.75
Historically, the first major, internationally recognized statelessness situations have been
created by mass denationalisation policies following World War I and in the period pre-
ceding World War II.76 Pursuant to the academic communis opinio in this matter, depriva-
tion of nationality resulting in statelessness would generally be arbitrary,77 unless it serves
a legitimate purpose and complies with the principle of proportionality. This approach is
clearly underpinned by different universal and regional treaty provisions. The point of
departure is again the 1961 CRS. Its Article 8(1) lays down the general rule: ‘[a] Contracting
State shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him
stateless.’
Nevertheless, there exists an exhaustive list of exceptions under this obligation: the
subsequent paragraphs of the same Article allow for a limited set of circumstances under
which deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness is still permitted. In line with
the general principle of interpretation in international human rights law, confirmed by
72 See e.g. UN Human Rights Council Resolutions 7/10 of 27 March 2008 (A/HRC/RES/7/10), operative Paras.
2-3; 10/13 of 26 March 2009 (A/HRC/RES/10/13), operative Paras. 2-3; or 20/5 of 16 July 2012
(A/HRC/RES/20/5), operative Paras. 2 and 4.
73 E.g. Dörr, 2012, Para. 6.
74 Manly and van Waas, 2010, pp. 63-66; Dörr, 2012, Para. 9.
75 Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009, Para.
51.
76 For concrete historical examples, see e.g. Hofmann, 2013, Paras. 4-8.
77 E.g. J. Chan, ‘The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right – The Current Trend Towards Recognition’, 12
Human Rights Law Journal (1991), pp. 1-14; R. Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law,
Transnational Publishers, New York, 1994 (Chapter 4: Human Rights Conventions and Other Instruments);
J. Goldston, ‘Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of Nonciti-
zens’, 20 Ethics and International Affairs (2006), pp. 321-347 (all quoted by L. van Waas, 2008, p. 40); Fourth
report on the expulsion of aliens by Mr. Maurice Kamto, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission,
60th session, A/CN.4/594, 24 March 2008, Para. 29.
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the intention of the drafters of the 1961 CRS articulated in the travaux préparatoires,78
these narrowly construed exceptions under the general rule shall be interpreted in a
restrictive manner. First, naturalized persons may be rendered stateless by withdrawal of
nationality if they have resided abroad for at least seven years and failed to declare their
intention to retain their nationality [Article 8(2) lit. (a)]. Second, by virtue of the same
provision, States may also deprive persons born abroad of their nationality if one year after
attaining majority, they do not reside in the State of nationality or register with the
appropriate authority. Third, deprivation of nationality rendering someone stateless is also
permissible if the nationality has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud [Article
8(2) lit. (b)].79 In relation to the latter, it is to be noted that there must be causality between
the fraud or misrepresentation and the grant of nationality. This means that the fraud
must be material to the acquisition of nationality. Furthermore, deprivation based on
misrepresentation or fraud would not be justified if the person was not aware and could
not have been aware that the information provided during the naturalization was untrue.80
In addition, a specific situation is worth examining: when authorities are considering the
deprivation of nationality of children due to misrepresentation or fraud. Here, one may
ask whether the main objective of preventing statelessness of children laid down in both
the 1961 Convention (Articles 1-4) and the 1989 CRC (Articles 7-8), read in light of the
principle of the best interest of the child, could prevail over this exception?81 It is easy to
argue that rendering a minor stateless is never in his/her best interest. As a consequence,
I find it legally tenable to conclude that thanks to the development of international human
rights law in the last decades, deprivation of children’s nationality on the basis of misrep-
resentation and fraud is now outlawed if it results in statelessness, owing to the considera-
tions of the best interest of the child and the principle of proportionality which plays the
most significant role here amongst the exceptions set out in Article 8(2) of the 1961 CRS.
Finally, certain additional exceptions are provided for in Article 8(3), which is a ‘stand still
clause’: they can be applied only in so far as those grounds have already been envisaged in
the domestic law of the Contracting State at the time of signature, ratification or accession
and the State expressly indicates its intention to retain them when it gives its consent to
be bound by the Convention. Only 15% of the Contracting States have made use of this
provision to retain a specific ground for deprivation of nationality under the stand still
clause.82 The exceptions cover two types of situations. They allow for deprivation of
78 Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT), travaux préparatoires can be used
as a supplementary means of treaty interpretation (Art. 32).
79 For a comprehensive analysis of this provisions and their desired interpretation, see UNHCR, ‘Tunis Con-
clusions’, Paras. 52-64.
80 UNHCR, ‘Tunis Conclusions’, Paras. 58-59.
81 See similarly: ibid., Para. 62.
82 Ibid., Para. 65. The list of such declarations can be consulted at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20V/V-4.en.pdf (last accessed on 1 July 2014).
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nationality resulting in statelessness due to 1) conduct inconsistent with the duty of loyalty
to the State (on the basis of services rendered or emoluments received from foreign States,83
or on the basis of a conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interest of the State84) or
2) because of evidence of allegiance to another State (the person has taken an oath, or made
a formal declaration of allegiance to another State). As Mantu explains: ‘[t]hese exceptions
are related to the main duty that citizens have towards their state, namely the duty of loyalty.
Thus when that duty is breached the state has the power to sever the formal link between
itself and the citizen, and deny him membership as punishment for his acts.’85 However,
the last exception (allegiance to another State) seems to be obsolete in most circumstances,
since usually the only opportunity for a person to make a formal oath of allegiance to
another State is at the very last phase of the naturalization procedure, when the occurrence
of statelessness is no longer an issue. Moreover, I share the view that this scenario has also
been superseded by later developments in domestic nationality laws which increasingly
place less importance on formal allegiance to the State.86
The above regulatory architecture clearly shows that international law leaves just a thin
margin of manoeuvre for States when they wish to lawfully withdraw a person’s nationality
causing statelessness. Article 8(1)-(3) of the 1961 CRS aim at striking a delicate balance
between the rights of the individual and the legitimate interests of the State. The underlying
concept is that deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness is generally arbitrary,
since its impact on the individual outweighs by far the interests the State seeks to protect.
This approach is also evidenced by the fact that the Convention does not allow reservations
to these provisions87 or for States to otherwise exclude individuals from the scope of the
Convention due to other types of conduct (exhaustive list of exceptions).88 What is more,
the procedural due process requirement is explicit in this context: in all cases of permitted
deprivation of nationality, such a decision may only be made in accordance with law, and
83 Art. 8(3) lit. (a)(i). As highlighted by UNHCR, this exception must be interpreted narrowly and may not be
applied where the individual rendered services to, or received emoluments from an entity which does not
constitute a State (e.g. an intergovernmental organization, a non-State actor in an armed conflict, or an
NGO). See ibid., Para. 67.
84 Art. 8(3) lit. (a)(ii). This exception to the basic rule established a very high threshold for deprivation of
nationality resulting in statelessness. Taking the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘seriously prejudicial’ and
‘vital interest’, in accordance with Art. 31(1) of 1969 VCLT, such a conduct must threaten the very foundations
and internal structure of that State whose nationality is at stake. The notion ‘seriously prejudicial’ requires
that the individual concerned is actually capable of negatively impacting the State. Similarly, ‘vital interest’
sets a much higher threshold than ‘national interest’ which is confirmed by the travaux préparatoires. See:
ibid., Para. 68.
85 Mantu, 2009, p. 9.
86 UNHCR, ‘Tunis Conclusions’, Para. 69.
87 Art. 17 of the 1961 CRS stipulates:
‘1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession any State may make a reservation in respect of Arts. 11,
14 or 15.
2. No other reservations to this Convention shall be admissible.’
88 UNHCR, ‘Tunis Conclusions’, Para. 23.
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against it the right to a fair hearing by a court or other independent body shall be provided
for [Article 8(4)].
If we turn our attention to the regional level, we may witness an even stronger protection
against arbitrary deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness. The 1997 European
Convention on Nationality, placing the prohibition of arbitrarily depriving one of his/her
nationality amongst the basic principles upon which ‘rules on nationality of each State
Party shall be based’,89 went further by setting out more limited restrictions on the possible
exceptions.90 Its Article 7(3) allows for deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness
only and exclusively in cases of misrepresentation and fraud (according to the Convention
language: ‘by means of fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant
fact attributable to the applicant’).91 The old-fashioned exceptions introduced by Article
8(2)-(3) of the 1961 CRS have not been taken up by the drafters of the European Conven-
tion. The Explanatory Report of the ECN, which is an official means for interpreting the
Convention by virtue of Article 31(3) of the 1969 VCLT,92 goes into the details concerning
the conditions of the application of the ‘misrepresentation and fraud’ exception by saying
that fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact has to be
the result of a deliberate act or omission by the applicant which was a significant factor in
the acquisition of nationality. Moreover, ‘concealment of any relevant fact’means conceal-
ment of a relevant condition which would prevent the acquisition of nationality by the
person concerned (such as bigamy). Finally, it explains that ‘relevant’ in this context refers
to facts (such as concealment of another nationality, or concealment of a criminal conviction
for a serious offence) which, if they had been known before the nationality was granted,
would have resulted in a decision refusing to grant such nationality.93 Even within the
boundaries of this exception, Recommendation No. R (1999) 18 aims at narrowing State
discretion by commending a balancing approach and factors to be considered before such
a decision is taken: ‘[i]n order to avoid situations of statelessness, a State should not neces-
sarily deprive of its nationality persons who have acquired its nationality by fraudulent
conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact. To this effect, the gravity
of the facts as well as other relevant circumstances, such as the genuine and effective link
of these persons with the State concerned, should be taken into account.’94 This soft law
89 Art. 4. lit. c.
90 See also: Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166), Para. 77. (available
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/166.htm (last accessed on 1 July 2014).
91 Art. 7(1) lit. b.
92 Art. 31(2) lit. b): ‘The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise […] (b) any
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty’ [emphasis added – M.T.].
93 Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166), Para. 61. In the Hungarian
legal scholarship also mentioned e.g. by A. Lőrincz, ‘Az állampolgárságtól való megfosztás mint biztonsági
eszköz’, XIII Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények (2012), pp. 323-324.
94 Principle II. C. c. (emphasis added).
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norm therefore emphasizes the importance of narrowly construing an exception of this
kind as well as of the principle of proportionality.95
6.4.5 Deprivation of Nationality for the Sole Purpose of Expulsion: Arbitrary
When arbitrary withdrawal of nationality is combined with expulsion from the territory
of the State of former nationality, the violation of international law becomes even more
flagrant. As the UNHCR observes, discriminatory denationalization of individuals is often
followed by their expulsion.96 In history, there have been a number of instances when
States have resorted to the practice of depriving persons of their nationality in order to
circumvent the rule that a State could not expel its nationals.97 This issue has recently come
up in the jurisprudence of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission with regard to dual
(Ethiopian-Eritrean) nationals.98 Although the Claims Commission in its award rejected
Eritrea’s argument that the denationalization and subsequent expulsion of persons with
dual Ethiopian and Eritrean nationality were contrary to international law, the Commission
held that the expulsion from Ethiopia of dual nationals for unknown security reasons, was
arbitrary and thus contrary to international law.99 The International Law Commission also
devoted attention to this situation when preparing the Draft Articles on the expulsion of
aliens, adopted in second reading in August 2014. Article 8 of this text states that a ‘state
shall not make its national an alien, by deprivation of nationality, for the sole purpose of
expelling him or her’. In the ILC’s view, such a deprivation of nationality, irrespective of
the fact that it is the person’s sole nationality or he is a dual national, would be abusive,
indeed arbitrary.100 What is apparent is that this rule is without any doubt applicable for
dual (multiple) nationals. On the other hand, when such an abusive denationalization
causes statelessness, it is ab ovo considered arbitrary save the legitimate exceptions estab-
lished by the 1961 CRS generally or the 1997 ECN specifically, on the European continent.
However, the scenario envisaged in Draft Article 8 can be conceived as a complementary
means of protection against such an arbitrary act of the State. Even if a decision on depri-
vation would qualify as lawful under the exceptions permitted by international treaties, as
95 Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009, Para.
53.
96 Achiron, 2005, p. 39.
97 Expulsion of aliens. Memorandum by the Secretariat, International Law Commission, 58th session,
A/CN.4/565, 10 July 2006, Para. 906.
98 Partial Award, Civilians Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission,
The Hague, 17 December 2004.
99 Fourth report on the expulsion of aliens by Mr. Maurice Kamto, Special Rapporteur, International Law
Commission, 60th session, A/CN.4/594, 24 March 2008, Para. 30.
100 Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2014),
General Assembly Official Records, Sixty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10, A/69/10, Chapter IV, p. 33.
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long as the sole purpose of the depravation was to render the individual an alien and to
expel that person from the territory of the State, it will still qualify as arbitrary deprivation,
on account of the rule expressed in Draft Article 8, and hereby considered to be unlawful.
6.5 The Role of ex post Effective Remedies
When someone is actually deprived of his/her nationality, legal remedies against such a
harsh intrusion into private life that can even destroy one’s identity, are of outstanding
importance. As a result, violations of the general prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of
nationality must be open to an effective remedy. Persons having been arbitrarily deprived
of their nationality must have access to legal avenues to challenge the validity of such acts,
and to different kinds of ex post effective remedies, notably restoration of nationality as
the principle remedy (preferably automatically); issuance of documents allowing the
individual to make nationality effective as well as registration as a national in relevant civil
registries.101 The UNHCR noted that in some cases arbitrary deprivation of nationality
may be linked to past persecution against a specific group of people, in the refugee context.
In such situations, following the change of circumstances in the country concerned,
establishing a simple application procedure for re-acquisition of nationality of the once
persecuted population seems to be appropriate, too.102
Following a thorough review of relevant hard law obligations in this matter, it is only
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child that is not silent in this regard. The CRC
expressis verbis stipulates, in a relatively detailed manner, that ‘[w]here a child is illegally
deprived of some or all elements of his or her identity [including nationality], State Parties
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily
his or her identity’ [Article 8(2)]. Besides this sole legally binding, specific obligation, a
considerable set of soft law instruments have been developed later on. They evidence the
emergence of a general norm of international law requiring effective remedies against
arbitrary denationalization, not yet crystallized, but noticeably advancing towards universal
acceptance. The UN Human Rights Council called upon States in subsequent resolutions
to ensure that an effective remedy is available to persons who have been arbitrarily deprived
of their nationality, including but not limited to restoration of nationality.103 Likewise, a
series of UNHCR ExCom conclusions have regularly addressed this issue, urging States to
101 Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009, Para.
59; UNHCR, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General,
A/HRC/25/28, 19 December 2013, Para. 34; UNHCR, ‘Tunis Conclusions’, Para. 28.
102 UNHCR, ‘Tunis Conclusions’, Para. 29.
103 UN Human Rights Council resolutions 7/10 of 27 March 2008 (A/HRC/RES/7/10), operative Paras. 7; 10/13
of 26 March 2009 (A/HRC/RES/10/13), operative Paras. 2-3; or 20/5 of 16 July 2012 (A/HRC/RES/20/5),
operative Para. 9.
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assist stateless persons in providing them with access to legal remedies to redress stateless-
ness, in particular resulting from the arbitrary deprivation of nationality.104 However,
practical obstacles often make it extremely difficult to benefit from the available legal
remedies. Access to effective remedies normally relies on providing proof for personal
identification, a task that can be seriously hampered by the effect of deprivation of
nationality, especially if it rendered the person stateless. In this respect, both UNHCR and
the UN Secretary General recommend States to envisage adopting flexible rules for evidence,
facilitating proof of identity, which would allow the person concerned to provide witness
testimony or resort to various sources of documentary evidence.105
6.6 Deprivation of Nationality and EU Law: A Step Forward towards
Enhanced Protection
Switching the focus from international law (‘father’) to the EU legal order (‘son’), the very
first salient feature is that neither the founding treaties of the European Union, nor sec-
ondary EU law contain provisions on the acquisition or loss of Member States’ nationality
or the exercise of this right by States. Although both the Treaty on the European Union
(TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)106 attach certain
rights and entitlements to the possession of a nationality of the Member States, the EU
Treaties do not regulate who and under which conditions shall be considered nationals of
the Member States. In short, the EU still does not have competences in nationality matters,107
a matter of principle reaffirmed in Declaration No. 2 to Maastricht Treaty108 and the
Edinburgh Decision of Heads of State and Government of 12 December 1992.109
However, EU lawyers know well the doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) in the famous Micheletti case,110 where the CJEU held: ‘[u]nder
104 E.g. UNHCR ExCom conclusions No. 102 (LVI) 2005, Para. (y); No. 106 (LVII) 2006, Para. (v).
105 Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009, Paras.
59, 68; Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, Report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/13/34,
14 December 2009, Para. 46.
106 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, OJ C 83, 30 March 2010, pp. 1-388.
107 See Arts. 4 and 6 TFEU.
108 Declaration No. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht on nationality of a Member State (OJ C 191, 29 July
1992, p. 98).
109 Denmark and the European Union, Annex I (Decision of Heads of State and Government, meeting within
the European Council, concerning certain problems raised by Denmark, on the Treaty on the European
Union), Section A – Citizenship (OJ C 348, 31 December 1992, p. 1).
110 Case C-369/90, M. V. Micheletti and others v. Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria, Judgement of 7 July
1992, ECR [1992] p. I-4239. For a detailed analysis of the judgment, see e.g. H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, Case
Note (Case C-369/90. M. V. Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobernio en Cantabria, Judgment of
7 July 1992, not yet reported), 30 Common Market Law Review (1993), pp. 623-637; D. Ruzié, ‘Nationalité,
effectivité et droit communautaire’, 97 Revue générale de droit international public (1993), pp. 107-120.
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international law, it is for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, to
lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality’.111 Interestingly, despite
the explicit reference to international law, thus implicitly recognizing that the term
‘nationality’ does not have a specific definition under EU law,112 the first part of this formula
does not follow the concept of the 1930 Hague Convention. In the latter, the limitations
on States’ sovereign prerogatives in nationality issues operate on the international plane,
i.e. the legal effects towards other States of a given nationality can be restricted and other
States are entitled to not recognize such a nationality if it violates certain standards stem-
ming from international law. Yet, in Micheletti, the CJEU placed restrictions, of EU law
origin, on the internal exercise – regulating the loss and acquisition of nationality in the
domestic sphere – of the States’ exclusive competence concerning nationality matters. This
difference can also be explained by the level and focus of regulation as well as the field of
application of the rules of the respective legal systems: international law is still mainly an
inter-State legal order of co-ordination (horizontal structure) while EU law traditionally
and extensively addresses intra-State issues and situations, directly affecting the domestic
legal life of Member States (dominantly a vertical structure, similar to municipal law in
this regard).
Then comes the pressing question: what does ‘having due regard to Community law’
mean? Given that subsequent judgments of the CJEU dealing with similar matters only
repeated this phrase and failed to clarify its meaning and consequences,113 EU law scholars
have tried to elaborate more on it. On the basis of those academic writings, the following
prohibitions (or in other words: requirements) may be formulated towards domestic leg-
islation or practice in nationality matters: 1) Member States’ nationality legislations should
not violate fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights or as
general principles of law interpreted by the jurisprudence of the CJEU114; 2) domestic
111 Ibid., Para. 10 (emphasis added).
112 See the Opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro delivered on 30 January 1992 in the Micheletti case, ECR
[1992] p. I-4254, Para. 3 (‘As yet there is no Community definition of nationality; the provisions of Community
law which require an individual to possess the ‘nationality’ of a Member State as a prerequisite for their
application must be understood as referring to the national law of the State whose nationality serves as the
basis of the right relied upon’).
113 E.g. Case C-179/98, Belgian State v. Mesbah, Judgment of 11 November 1999, ECR [1999] p. I-7955; Case
C-192/99, The Queen contra Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte: Manjit Kaur, Judgment
of 20 February 2001, ECR [2001] p. I-1237; Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judgment of 19 October 2004, ECR [2004], p. I-9925.
114 S. O’Leary, ‘Nationality and Community Citizenship: A Tale of Two Uneasy Bedfellows’, 12 Yearbook of
European Law (1992), p. 356; H.U. Jessurum d’Oliviera, 1993, pp. 636-637; S. Hall, Nationality, Migration
Rights and Citizenship of the Union, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1995, pp. 56-
57; G-R. de Groot, ‘The Relationship between the Nationality Legislation of the Member States of the
European Union and European Citizenship’, in M. La Torre (Ed.), European Citizenship: An Institutional
Challenge [The European Forum 3], Kluwer Law International, The Hague-London-Boston, 1998, p. 124.
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nationality laws should not violate the so-called loyalty clause [Article 4(3) TEU]115;
3) Member States should not exercise en masse naturalization to certain populations
without prior consultation with EU partners (e.g. in respect of minorities living in countries
neighboring the kin-State) which could be in breach of the principle of solidarity [Article
3(3)TEU]116; 4) nationality policies must be in conformity with the territorial scope of the
Treaties [Article 52 TEU, Article 355 TFEU] (e.g. not excluding British Dependent Citizens
living in Gibraltar from ‘UK citizens’)117; and finally 5) loss of Member State nationality
is not permissible because of long-term residence in other Member State,118 in order to
respect freedom of movement of EU citizens as one of the four Union freedoms, a corner-
stone of European integration.
This ambiguous legal situation has significantly changed with the landmark judgment
of the CJEU rendered in the Rottmann case (2010).119 As per the factual background of
the case, Janko Rottmann, originally an Austrian national, exercised his right of free
movement and moved to Germany in 1995 (apparently before criminal sanctions could
be applied). Three years later he applied for German nationality, without disclosing to the
German authorities that criminal proceedings have been instituted against him. German
nationality was granted to Mr. Rottmann in 1999, and by way of naturalization he lost his
Austrian nationality ex lege, in line with Austrian nationality law. However, the Austrian
authorities informed the city of Munich, which had handled the request for naturalisation,
about the criminal proceedings against Rottmann in Austria. As a result, Germany revoked
the naturalisation decision on the grounds that it had been obtained fraudulently. The
effect of the withdrawal of German nationality, which did not entail automatic reacquisition
of Austrian nationality under Austrian law, would render Rottmann stateless (losing also
his status of EU citizen).120 This scenario finally offered the CJEU a good opportunity to
explain the scope and exact meaning of the expression ‘having due regard to [European
Union] law’. If we put the legal reasoning into a logical sequence, the following can be
depicted. First, the Court echoed the general rules of international law applicable to the
case, i.e. that the rules on the acquisition and loss of nationality fall within the competence
115 O’Leary, 1992, p. 379; Hall, 1995, pp. 64-73; de Groot, 1998, pp. 123, 135.
116 Hall, 1995, pp. 67, 73.
117 de Groot, 1998, p. 135.
118 O’Leary, 1992, pp. 366, 378; Hall, 1995, p. 33; de Groot, 1998, pp. 123, 136-147; G-R. de Groot, ‘Towards a
European Nationality Law’, 8(3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (October 2004), p. 8.
119 Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of 2 March 2010, ECR [2010], p. I-1449.
120 The summary of facts has been based on H. van Eijken, ‘European Citizenship and the Competence of
Member States to Grant and to Withdraw the Nationality of their Nationals’, 27(72) Merkourios (2010),
Case Note, pp. 65-69; J. Shaw, ‘Setting the Scene: The Rottmann Case Introduced’, in J. Shaw (Ed.), ‘Has the
European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law?’, EUI Working Papers,
RSCAS 2011/62 (December 2011), p. 1; and the résumé of the case on the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship,
available at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-case-law (last accessed on 1 July 2014).
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of the Member States and arbitrary deprivation of nationality is prohibited.121 Second, it
drew attention to applicable EU law in this specific field of national competence, empha-
sizing the well-established horizontal rule in its case-law: even if a ‘matter falls within the
competence of the Member States […], in situations covered by European Union law, the
national rules concerned must have due regard to the latter’.122 Given that deprivation of
nationality causes also the loss of EU citizenship and the rights attached to it, this situation
falls within the ambit of EU law, by reason of its nature and consequences.123 This clearly
showcases the wide reach of EU citizenship as construed by the Court. Third, the CJEU
turned its attention to the legal ramifications of the general ban not to arbitrarily deprive
a person of his/her nationality under EU law. In this context, it reminded that ‘[w]hen a
State deprives a person of his nationality because of his acts of deception, legally established,
that deprivation cannot be considered to be an arbitrary act’,124 then reached the conclusion
that deprivation of nationality is not contrary to EU law as long as it is in line with inter-
national law. Nevertheless, the CJEU introduced a supplementary requirement, an addi-
tional standard of review when assessing the legality of an act of withdrawal of nationality:
the proportionality test. Quite disputably, the proportionality test has not been conducted
by the Court itself, but it is to be done by the national court, which in my view quite
undermines the uniform application of EU law, especially in situations where the suprana-
tional, autonomous legal status of EU citizenship is at stake.125 So as to guide national
courts, the CJEU identified pertinent elements to take into account when examining a
decision withdrawing naturalisation against the principle of proportionality. These are the
following: 1) the consequences that the decision entails for the person concerned and, if
relevant, for the members of his family; 2) the gravity of the offence committed by that
person; 3) the lapse of time between the naturalisation decision and the decision on with-
drawal; and finally 4) the possibility to recover the original nationality (including examining
whether, having regard to all relevant circumstances, the person should be afforded a rea-
sonable period of time in order to try to recover the nationality of his Member State of
origin).126 ‘This latter factor seems to hint at some relationship of cooperation needing to
emerge between Member States in these circumstances’ – notes Professor Shaw.127 Two
further remarks should be made. The first is a seemingly technical one, about terminology:
the CJEU did not borrow the traditional term for this kind of involuntary loss of nationality
121 Rottmann judgment, Paras. 14, 39, 53.
122 Ibid., Para. 41.
123 Ibid., Para. 42.
124 Ibid., Para. 53.
125 See also D. Kochenov, ‘Two Sovereign States vs. a Human Being: CJEU as a Guardian of Arbitrariness in
Citizenship Matters’, in J. Shaw (Ed.), ‘Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State
Sovereignty in nationality law?’, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2011/62 (December 2011), p. 14.
126 Ibid., Paras. 56, 58.
127 Shaw, 2011, p. 4.
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from international law (’deprivation’), but consistently used ‘withdrawal’ which might be
explained by the Court’s endeavour to accentuate the autonomous nature of EU law and
its legal terms vis-à-vis international law. Second, on a more substantial note, decisions
on withdrawal of nationality can be subject to judicial review before the Court of Justice of
the EU, acting as final arbiter. The question is whether this also holds true when a particular
Member State excludes the judicial review of withdrawal decisions by national courts, e.g.
having made a reservation to the 1997 ECN in this respect? Against this background, it is
even more interesting how far reaching implications can be deduced from the next state-
ment of the Luxembourg Court:
[t]he proviso that due regard must be had to European Union law […] enshrines
the principle that, in respect of citizens of the Union, the exercise of [the power
to lay down the conditions for acquisition/loss of nationality], in so far as it
affects the rights conferred and protected by the legal order of the Union, as is
in particular the case of a decision withdrawing naturalisation […] is amenable
to judicial review carried out in the light of European Union law.128
Summing it up, in the Rottmann judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union
elaborated more on the procedural standards of the lawful deprivation of nationality,
notably by incorporating proportionality as a general principle of EU law129 into the
assessment of the arbitrariness of deprivation of nationality as well as foreseeing judicial
review before the CJEU and via national courts, in light of EU law. But all this merely
applies in relation to acts of deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness, which
only constitutes, as described above, one manifestation of arbitrariness when a nationality
is withdrawn. With regard to the nature of arguments, in the context of the deprivation
of nationality, the Court did not focus on a human rights imperative to avoid statelessness,
but on the specific, supranational legal status of the individual130 and the rights stemming
from EU citizenship, which is the ‘fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.
Some say that ‘Rottmann went […] on fetishizing the few similarly exceptions from the
main rule of international law on avoidance of statelessness’, adding that the ‘Court is
seemingly technical and cold blooded.’131 By contrast, I find that the technical approach
was somewhat unavoidable and necessary, since it was solely through the lenses of EU
128 Ibid., Para. 48.
129 See in the same way G.T. Davies, ‘The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of Union Citizenship and Rights’,
in J. Shaw (Ed.), Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality
Law?’, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2011/62 (December 2011), p. 9.
130 Shaw, 2011, p. 3.
131 Kochenov, 2011, p. 14.
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citizenship that the Court could find jurisdiction ratione materiae in this case and this thin
ice did not realistically allow for more.
6.7 Concluding Remarks
After having analysed the concept and content of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation
of nationality under international law and EU law, looking for new perspectives, some
general concluding remarks can be phrased. First, we have seen that it is still a topic of
particular importance, even nowadays, in the era of global human rights. As the UK
Supreme Court eloquently concluded:
[a]lthough the international growth of human rights during the past fifty years
has to some extent succeeded in establishing that a person’s right to have rights
stems, instead, from his existence as a human being, worldwide legal disabilities
with terrible practical consequences still flow from lack of nationality.132
Currently, besides the quite solid international legal framework, leaving extremely restricted
room for States to deprive persons of their nationality, noteworthy policy developments
can be seen on the universal plane. The United Nations and its different bodies have started
putting more emphasis on this topic in the framework of the international human rights
agenda since the new millennium, which is marked by the proliferation of the resolutions
of the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council and the UNHCR Executive
Committee, not to mention the extensive groundwork laid down by the Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights as well as various reports of the UN Secretary General.
Recently, the Human Rights Council had engaged in collecting information from States
until mid-2013, then a larger and richer State practice was made available by the end of
2013.133 Proportionality appears to be a new element in the assessment of arbitrariness,
not only as an advocacy tool used by UNHCR and other UN agencies as well as human
rights NGOs working in this field, but first confirmed in international jurisprudence, in
a legally binding way, albeit limited to European legal realities. At any rate, this development
is not to be underestimated, which is well illustrated by Laura van Waas’s thoughts from
the pre-Rottmann period:
132 Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) v. Al-Jedda (Respondent), Judgment of 9 October
2013 [2013] UKSC 62, Para. 12.
133 See the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality
(A/HRC/25/28, 19 December 2013).
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[i]t is certainly true that to permit the loss or deprivation of nationality in the
knowledge that this will lead to statelessness is becoming increasingly unaccept-
able and is deemed by some to amount to (prohibited) arbitrary deprivation
of nationality. However, until an international […] treaty body or court
explicitly address this question, it will remain unclear in which exact circum-
stances the creation of statelessness in this manner is or is not permissible.134
As a soft form of interaction between EU law and international law, the principle of pro-
portionality, brought up by the CJEU, infiltrated the international policy-making agenda
and appeared in universal documents such as various reports prepared by the UN Secretary
General135 or the UNHCR interpretative guidance (cf. the ‘Tunis Conclusions’).136 As far
as the EU is concerned, the additional requirements formulated by Rottmann in order to
avoid statelessness as an emanation of arbitrary deprivation of nationality represent an
important step forward towards an enhanced protection of core human rights such as the
right to a nationality, even if emerging rather as a side effect of a reasoning first and foremost
shielding EU citizens and their rights. The EU also needs more coordination with the
Council of Europe, which has without doubt the greatest expertise in nationality matters;
such coordination is likely to be intensified in the near future.137 In my assessment every-
thing is granted for a greater convergence between regional and universal legal standards,
with a view to combating arbitrary deprivation of nationality around the globe, always
keeping in mind that any interference with the enjoyment of nationality has a significant,
often disastrous, impact on the enjoyment of basic human rights.
134 van Waas, 2008, p. 90.
135 See the most recent report of the UN Secretary-General on human rights and arbitrary deprivation of
nationality (A/HRC/25/28, 19 December 2013), Paras. 4, 39, 40.
136 Paras. 19-24.
137 The recent activity of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is promising, see e.g. Access to
nationality and the effective implementation of the European Convention on Nationality – Report (Doc.
13392, 23 January 2014, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Rapporteur: Mr. Boriss Cilevics),
then Resolution 1989 (2014) on Access to nationality and the effective implementation of the European
Convention on Nationality and Recommendation 2042 (2014) Access to nationality and the effective
implementation of the European Convention on Nationality (both adopted on 9 April 2014).
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